Osler's Razor

Option Four?

For a long time (maybe ten years) I have believed that the Iranians will get the bomb--and, short of massive and decisive military action, there was/is not much we can or should do to stop them. If our attempt at liberating Iraq and reforming the place into a thriving Middle East democracy had succeeded, the military option regarding Iran might be a strong possibility. But, it didn't, so it isn't.

To be clear, I disagree with the people who assert we could have made a better deal (or promote a military option) in order to keep Iran from going nuclear.

So, starting with the premise that the Iranians are going to go nuclear, where should we be in all this?

Negotiating would be fine--but we should have started and ended with the organizing principle that the talks were designed to degrade the Iranian strategic position in every way possible--as they steam forward inexorably toward a bomb. So, when they join the nuclear club, like Korea, for example, the bomb would be all they have (no great prestige, no great conventional military capability, and no huge economic surplus to spread around). Sort of the opposite of what we did.

On the positive side, an emerging Iran means that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel need to be on their toes (not a new situation for Israel, of course). But, for the first time in a long time, important nations of the Middle East are thinking through standing on their own and acting in their self interests and playing out the hand with their own treasure (not house money). A decreased USA presence in the region is not altogether bad (how long can we afford to keep peace in the Middle East?).

A standoff between the Shiite and Sunni nations seems likely. Saudi and Egypt and Israel have a lot in common in this confrontation---I am starting to wonder if them coming together in common cause is beyond the realm of possibility. Sure, if Iran goes nuclear (which they will), Egypt and Saudi will have to have nukes--but I am not sure if that won't actually have a temporary (for a generation or so) stabilizing effect.

So, we stand back and help out where we can--but do none of the heavy lifting and see if these guys pull off a mini cold war. And, if Iran runs the gauntlet and emerges as something more than a regional power, then they will actually be stepping on the toes of the Russians and Chinese long before they will actually pose a threat to us. In the meantime, we stay tough and powerful in a TR sort of way rather than a Pax Americana sort of regime.

All that would have been a fairly realistic stance as we transition from the main enforcer in the Middle East, content on projecting our power across an ocean to maintain peace and stability in a vital region, to a more humble presence as a wise and powerful advisor to our friends in the region.

However, what is so crazy about the Obama strategy is that he seems to think he can be friends with the Iranians. He seems intent on dumping our traditional allies in the region and betting it all on our new best friends in Tehran. So, instead of throwing oil and nails on the road to impede the progress of Iranian hegemony, he gives them the green light and lots of encouragement in hopes that we can team up together in the future. I just don't get it.
 

WF-- Negotiating with the Iranians is different than being "friends." We could have fun making a list of Ronald Reagan's friends if that is the standard-- or any other president who accomplished things.

I see your point about regional alliances doing some of the work, and I like it. However, is there really any hope that Iran, Egypt, and Israel would do such a thing?
 

Saudi Arabia and Egypt have lots of reasons to work together--and often do. The Egypt-Saudi-Israel alliance would most likely be back-channel (I always hear that the non-public dialogue between those three nations has always been pretty rich and helpful--a diplomatic open secret). Something more official would probably be impossible for the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But who knows? This is really a game-changer.

Regarding the distinction between friends and negotiating: I agree that they are different (which was actually my point). Everything I hear from both sides of the partisan divide leads me to conclude that the President really entertains some incredibly optimistic ambitions about transforming the USA-Iranian relationship. And, when he thinks legacy, evidently, this is what he envisions (an historic new friendship)--not just merely placing Iran on a regulated and monitored path to a nuclear in fifteen years.

In terms of Reagan and friends and negotiating: I am not sure I take your point. As for the "list," who do you have in mind? The US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War is a great example of what I propose: negotiate with every fiber over the course of four decades to reduce Soviet capacity to project their power. Once Gorbachev and Yeltsin come along, you start to see the relationship thaw--and even a sense of blossoming friendship (perhaps a false bloom)--but, back when the Soviets were bad and scary actors, it was all business.

As I say, I am fine (probably prefer) negotiation with Iran--I just want us to be honest with ourselves about who they really are.

 

I have heard a lot of people speak about the agreement who have never read it, some even within minutes of the announcement, and some days, weeks, months before. I think if Iran had said, we will put all of our military and all of our nuclear people under U.S. military and nuclear management, carte blance, some people would have opposed that deal as well.

This is a really tough deal for Iran, and they know it. But the alternative for them was to continue to suffer economically to a degree that threatened chaos and perhaps another revolution. I do not think Iran can actually work on getting a nuke device under this agreement, with all of the inspections, etc.
 

Probably the best deal we could get, realistically.

It is too bad that Kerry couldn't get the 4 hostages back, however.
 

I don't know enough about the specifics of the deal to have an opinion.

But I have a related question: what is the legal status of such an agreement? I've read that the President must submit the deal to Congress for approval. Congress could then vote not to approve the deal with a simple majority of both houses. The President could then veto the disapproval, a veto that would require a 2/3 majority of the Senate to override. So effectively, the deal could go into effect with the approval of as little as a 1/3 of the Senate (and the political maneuvering seems to focus on a handful of Democrat senators for this reason).

How does that square with the Article II, Section 2 requirement that treaties be approved by a 2/3 majority of the Senate? Does that mean that this deal is not a treaty? And if not, what is it? Is it legally binding or enforceable?

Color me confused.