Monday, February 23, 2009
Uniformity and the Justices
As usual, Doug Berman's blog has another fascinating angle on American law, this time pointing out the odd and striking similarities between the Justices of the United States Supreme Court (not that I'm not pretty happy with them right now). For example, despite their ideological differences:
1) Eight of the nine attended the same two law schools.
2) ALL of them came to the court from the same job: Judge on a U.S. Court of Appeal.
3) None of them have any experience in an elected office.
Does this matter? If any debate benefits from a diversity of viewpoints (a proposition I agree with), I think it does.
Comments:
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On a related note: Paul Carrington has written an interesting proposal for mixing things up.
-http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/22/AR2009022201863.html?hpid=topnews
-http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/22/AR2009022201863.html?hpid=topnews
Not only are they very similar in the ways you discussed, with the exception of Roberts, none have actually practiced law any time in the past 20 years or so. They have very little understanding of the pressures and demands on the lawyers who actually appear before them.
It's an odd composition as well. One might think that Democrat appointees - which tend to be more progressive - would come straight from either politics or a law school classroom.
Neither vocation within the legal profession is currently represented on the court. In a small way, that troubles me, even as a conservative, because it seems to allow the court to stagnate intellectually, not from an ideological standpoint, but from the point that, regardless of ideology or philosophy of law, all have roughly the same professional experience.
Neither vocation within the legal profession is currently represented on the court. In a small way, that troubles me, even as a conservative, because it seems to allow the court to stagnate intellectually, not from an ideological standpoint, but from the point that, regardless of ideology or philosophy of law, all have roughly the same professional experience.
Yes, it seems logical that coming from such a narrow range of experiences would make a difference.
But do you think it actually has? I mean, would their decisions be any different if they had come from different law schools, or been professors or politicians or defense attorneys or prosecutors?
Aren't their decisions still based in larger principles, which might be particularly well developed from hearing cases on appeal?
I don't know--just wondering. I mean, it seems no matter what their experience, they are going to have to take a position, for or against, in the end--and would this position be markedly different if they'd come from practicing law?
But do you think it actually has? I mean, would their decisions be any different if they had come from different law schools, or been professors or politicians or defense attorneys or prosecutors?
Aren't their decisions still based in larger principles, which might be particularly well developed from hearing cases on appeal?
I don't know--just wondering. I mean, it seems no matter what their experience, they are going to have to take a position, for or against, in the end--and would this position be markedly different if they'd come from practicing law?
Swissgirl:
The philosophy of law I subscribe to would argue that any reference by judges to "larger principles" is a bit disingenuous. These principles are really just ways of legitimizing decisions based on much more personal, psychological or even sociological reasons.
There's no way of knowing sans empirical research on the matter. We'd need to poll people from different walks of life as to how they'd vote on various issues, but even then we wouldn't isolate all the variables. There's a whole life outside of the law that colors how we stand on issues. Being a prosecutor or a tax attorney is one thing, but what about being male, female, young, old, conservative, progressive, happy, sad, etc. and so on? Each of these things is going to factor in to the decision much more than such vaunted constructs like legal philosophy and guiding principles of law.
I suppose in the end coming from the same law school, or coming from a circuit court isn't going to make that much difference, because their lives outside of those two very superficial characteristics are so different.
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The philosophy of law I subscribe to would argue that any reference by judges to "larger principles" is a bit disingenuous. These principles are really just ways of legitimizing decisions based on much more personal, psychological or even sociological reasons.
There's no way of knowing sans empirical research on the matter. We'd need to poll people from different walks of life as to how they'd vote on various issues, but even then we wouldn't isolate all the variables. There's a whole life outside of the law that colors how we stand on issues. Being a prosecutor or a tax attorney is one thing, but what about being male, female, young, old, conservative, progressive, happy, sad, etc. and so on? Each of these things is going to factor in to the decision much more than such vaunted constructs like legal philosophy and guiding principles of law.
I suppose in the end coming from the same law school, or coming from a circuit court isn't going to make that much difference, because their lives outside of those two very superficial characteristics are so different.
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